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Abstract
We study OECD countries that differ in immigration policies but share a high level of
human capital. We find significant negative statistical relationship between 16 years lagged
fertility and the rate of immigration in a panel of 23 countries, which indicates that
immigration compensates for low fertility in the labor market.
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1. Introduction
There is an ongoing global shift in the demographic age structures that has implications for
innovation, saving, investment and growth (see e.g. Aksoy, Basso, Smith, and Grasl (2019)).
This evolution is driven by significant declines in total fertility and mortality rates in almost
every country leading to aging populations (see e.g. de Silva and Tenreyro (2020) and references
therein). We explore to what extent immigration mitigates the effects of declining fertility in
OECD countries, which differ in their migration policies but share a high level of human capital
by world standards.1
2. A Simple Model
Enter the Solow growth model. Production is given by a Cobb-Douglas production function
Y = Kα (AL)1−αwhere Y is output, K capital, L labor and A productivity. We let n be the rate
of local population growth and m the ratio of (net) immigrants to the population. Immigration
is a function of the difference between the present discounted value of future wages at home
and abroad B and the private cost of immigrating Ψ (m), which is assumed to be increasing in
the rate of immigration Ψ′ (m) > 0,Ψ′′ (m) < 0. The level of immigration is then determined
by the equality of the marginal private benefit and the marginal private cost of immigrating
B (t) = Ψ (m (t)) , (1)
so that the number of immigrants goes up until the marginal cost of moving to the destination
country is equal to the marginal benefit
m (t) = Ψ−1 (B (t)) = Φ (B (t)) ,Φ′ (·) > 0, (2)
where Φ is the inverse function of Ψ. In addition, we assume that there is a direct effect of
fertility on immigration that goes through labor shortages in the transition to a new steady
state.
Profit maximization with respect to labour in a competitive labour market gives wages
as the difference between output and rent paid to the owners of physical capital: w(t) =
(1 − α)A(t)(k(t))α, where k is the stock of capital per augmented labor unit AL, δ is the rate
1For a detailed survey on immigration policies, see e.g. Clemens (2011). For an excellent survey on im-
migration implications on human capital and development in sending countries see Docquier and Rapoport
(2012)).
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of depreciation and the rent or the real rate of interest is: r(t) = α(k∗)α−1. We assume that
only a part of the capital stock c can be used as collateral for foreign borrowing, D = cK and
capital is therefore not perfectly mobile2. Investment can be funded through both domestic
saving and borrowing from abroad while a part of income has to be diverted to pay interest on
foreign debt. At the steady state there is continuous borrowing from abroad so that the stock
of debt to augmented labor units d = D/AL remains constant and there is further borrowing
when the capital stock per augmented labor unit k is growing. The dynamics of the capital
stock k are the following:
(1 − c)k̇(t) = s ((k(t))α − (rf + p) ck(t)) − (δ + n+m (t) + g) k(t) + ck(t) (n+m (t) + g) (3)
where rf is the foreign rate of interest, p the risk premium, s the saving rate and g is the rate
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where ′∗′indicates steady-state values.There is a corresponding equation for foreign capital. The
steady-state rate of immigration is given by the following implicit function in m;













where the letter f indicates the rest of the world and the function Γ (with Γ‘(n) < 0 ) captures
the direct effect of population growth on the demand for immigrants. The rate of immigration
is a function of the local population growth rate n in addition to the saving rate, the interest
rate and the extent to which the country can borrow in international markets in comparison to
other countries. In addition, there is the direct effect of a fall in fertility due to labor shortages.
It follows that a fall in the rate of fertility has both an indirect positive effect on immigration
going through the discounted wage differential captured by the function Φ (·) and a direct
effect in the transition to a new steady state captured by the function Γ.
2See Barro, Mankiw, and Sala-i Martin (1995).
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3. Empirical Evaluation
Our model predicts that labor will migrate from countries with low productivity to countries
with high productivity, from countries with high population growth rates to those with low
population growth rates, from those with low saving rates to those with high saving rates and
finally, when capital is mobile between countries, from countries with high interest rates (risk
premium) to those with low interest rates. In this empirical section we aim to address these in
turn and provide reduced form panel data evidence to back up our theoretical claims.
3.1. Data
We use unbalanced panel data from a sample of 23 OECD countries. Annual immigration
inflow rate (IIR) is calculated as the ratio of (INFLOW) to population (POP) where data are
collected from the OECD. The total fertility rate (TFR) is collected from The Human Fertility
Database and computed as a sum of age-specific fertility rates for a certain calendar year across
all ages from 12 to 55+. The synthetic indicator TFR represents the mean number of children
a woman would have by the end of her reproductive life if she experienced at each age the
age-specific fertility rates observed in a given year.3 4 Our data for gross capital formation to
real GDP (I/Y ) is collected from the World Bank, World Development Indicators. Real GDP
per hours worked, wages in USD using 2018 base year and purchasing power parities (PPPs) for
private consumption of the same year, long term nominal interest rates i and consumer price
inflation CPI are all collected from the OECD. In a 5-years specification we use total years of
educational attainment for the total population as a measure of human capital (Barro and Lee
(2013)).
3.2. Econometric Specification
We first provide visual evidence for the three-way interaction between lagged fertility, wages
and immigration inflows. Our model suggests that there are both direct and indirect channels
through which past fertility changes affect migration inflows. When there is a decline in the
current local labour supply, immigrants fill the empty vacancies. Hence, when fertility rate
declines, we expect an increase in future replacement migration; we label this as the direct
3Our unbalanced panel includes Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France,
Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, England-Wales and the US.
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Figure 2: Wages and Immigration Flows (Conditioned on Country Fixed Effects)
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effect. The indirect effects of fertility changes works through changes in wages that are caused
by changes in the stock of capital per unit of labor or the growth of productivity. In this
case we expect the fertility decreases to affect wages positively, which in turn should affect
immigration inflows positively. Figure 1 plots the relationship between the immigration inflows
to population ratio, conditioned on country fixed effects (country dummies) only, and the 16
year lagged fertility rate. The relationship is clearly negative suggesting a potential effects
of fertility on immigration. Similarly, in Figure 2 we display the positive association between
one-year lagged wages and immigration inflows conditioned on country fixed effects.
In our immigration inflows specification we take the fertility decisions a generation ago (for
instance as in Becker, Murphy, and Tamura (1990)) as given and allow an indirect fertility
effect on the level immigration that follows. Thus our identifying assumption is that the value
of the local total fertility rate associated with roughly a generation ago is exogenous to future
economic conditions and most importantly to future migration inflows into the country.5 In all
specifications we condition on 16 years lagged local fertility rates as suggested by the Akaike
Information Criteria. Yearly time dummies are included to account for business cycle effects.
In alternative specifications we control for the log of gross capital formation to real GDP
(I/RGDP ) with a year lag, a measure of productivity proxied by the log real GDP per hour
worked (RGDPH) with a year lag, a proxy for one year lagged long term nominal interest
rates i and consumer price inflation CPI. In our final specification we include log real wages
(wages) as an additional control. This version of the model allows us to evaluate the indirect
effect of lagged fertility changes on net migration inflows transmitting through their impact on
lagged relative real wages next to their direct effect through replacement migration. Formally,
the benchmark fixed effects specification is given by:
log(IIRi,t) = αi + βt + γlog(TFRi,t−16) + δXi,t−1 + εi,t (6)
with X vector including the specified controls.
Table 1 shows the results for annual data (we suppress time dummies as controls for ease of
exposition). Column (1) displays results for the estimation where lagged log fertility appears
together with time dummies on the right-hand side, Column (2) shows results when we control
for the log of the ratio of gross capital formation and GDP, in Column (3) we add the log of
the hourly productivity level control and in Column (4) we add the interest rate and the rate
of inflation. The coefficient of log fertility lagged 16 years is around -2, which implies that
an increase in the total fertility rate of 1% would reduce migration inflows to total population
5See for instance Aksoy, Basso, Smith, and Grasl (2019) for formal weak exogeneity tests of the impact of
economic variables on demographic structures in a sample of OECD countries.
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Table 1: Estimation (annual)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
log(TFRt−16) -1.964
∗ (0.030) -1.972∗ (0.013) -1.932∗∗ (0.008) -1.572∗ (0.028) -1.710∗ (0.031)
log(I/Y )t−1 1.439
∗ (0.019) 1.444∗ (0.011) 1.349∗ (0.010)







Observations 580 576 573 516 444
Adjusted R2 0.504 0.561 0.567 0.608 0.441
AIC 713.5 640.2 628.8 438.2 459.1
BIC 809.5 736.1 724.5 527.4 549.2
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
ratio by 2% 16 years later. The coefficient of the investment rate is also statistically significant.
The numerical estimate shows that a 1% increase in the investment ratio is associated with an
increase of the immigration rate by 1.4. As predicted in our model with capital mobility, a
lower rate of interest attracts immigration, the coefficient estimate implies that a one percent
fall in interest rates, increases the immigration inflow rate by 0.12%. Finally, and somewhat
to our surprise, the log of hourly productivity has a statistically insignificant coefficient. Given
substantial immigration policy heterogeneity within the OECD (e.g. Japan implementing a
very strict immigration regime), our estimates should be regarded as fairly conservative.
Column (5) in Table 1 shows the direct effect of wages on migration flows next to lagged
fertility rates. As our model suggests, we find that one-year lagged wages affect inflows positively
without removing the significant positive impact of the decline in fertility rates on immigration.
We interpret our findings as supportive for both the direct and the indirect influence of fertility
changes on migration outcomes.
In order to further test for the indirect effect of fertility changes through its impact on
human capital we estimate a 5- years specification where we include lagged log fertility and
a contemporaneous measure of human capital proxied by the log of total years of educational
attainment (ED). We also control for the growth rate of the real GDP (∆y) where ∆yt =
log(fracRGDPtRGDPt−5) instead of the time dummies to account for business cycle effects,
where t − 5 denotes 5 years lag. Table 2 displays our 5-years estimation results. The human
capital proxy is both statistically and economically significant and suggests that the level of
human capital has a meaningful positive direct effect on immigration levels in addition to an
indirect effect going through fertility decisions roughly a generation ago. See also Figure 3 for
the scatter plot of log of the total fertility rate (lnfertility) against log of average schooling.
7
Table 2: Estimation (5 yearly)
(1) (2) (3)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
log(TFRt−10) -3.257 (0.001) -2.441 (0.002) -2.578 (0.001)
log(EDt) 2.197 (0.020) 2.693 (0.011)
∆yt 1.119 (0.121)
Observations 115 115 112
Adjusted R2 0.484 0.564 0.626
AIC 142.6 124.2 106.5
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Figure 3: Contemporaneous Relationship between Average Years of Schooling and Total Fer-
tility Rates (in logs)
4. Concluding Remarks
We study dynamic relationships between local fertility changes and replacement migration in
the OECD. We find that lagged fertility can partly explain differences in the current level of
immigration across OECD countries in spite of these countries’ diverse immigration policies.
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